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Abstract
As robots designed to physically interact with
humans become common in various applica-
tion areas, shared workspaces and force ex-
change between human and robot lead to new
challenges in terms of safety. Often, a vari-
ety of safety techniques is necessary, and de-
ciding what methods to include in a compre-
hensive safety framework is not an easy task.
This paper is concerned with the design of
robotic co-wokers that involve physical Human-
Robot Collaboration (pHRC), with humans
and robots in continuous direct physical con-
tact and exchanging forces. A hierarchical risk
reduction framework is presented for guiding
the design of robotic co-workers to reduce the
risk associated with hazards commonly found
in pHRC tasks. A case study is presented to
demonstrate the use of the framework in de-
signing an Assistance-as-Needed roBOT (AN-
BOT) which has been extensively tested in
practical industry applications.
1 Introduction
Human presence in the robot workspace makes physi-
cal Human-Robot Interaction (pHRI) one of the most
challenging research topics [Bicchi et al., 2008], and the
use of robots that physically interact with operators in
industrial applications is gaining a lot of interest. In a
literature review about exoskeletons used in industrial
applications, out of the 40 papers selected, 18 were pub-
lished in 2010 or later, showing the current interest in
pHRI for industrial applications [de Looze et al., 2016].
In the past few years the necessity of regulations and
standards regarding pHRI has risen due to the increasing
popularity of such robots. The International Standard
ISO 10218 presents standard requirements for industrial
robots and consists of two parts: “Robots” is mostly de-
signed for manufacturers, while the second part, called
Figure 1: Example of an application involving pHRC
“Robot systems and integration”, focuses on potential
safety issues that integrators have to keep in mind [In-
ternational Organization for Standardization, 2011a;
2011b]. This standard represents the main document
about safety related to industrial robotics, but it is quite
generic and only partially addresses collaborative robots.
Since collaborative robots are spreading in the market,
a Technical Specification was released in 2016 to extend
specific requirements presented in ISO 10218 about col-
laborative robots [International Organization for Stan-
dardization, 2016]. International Standards are meant to
give a general direction and used as a guide. They have
to be integrated with a risk assessment, which strongly
depends on the specific application.
We adopt the definition of the Québec WHO Col-
laborating Centre for Safety Promotion and Injury Pre-
vention, which states: “Safety is a state in which haz-
ards and conditions leading to physical, psychological
or material harm are controlled in order to preserve
the health and well-being of individuals and the com-
munity” [World Health Organisation, 1998]. A way
of improving safety is to develop hardware specifically
designed to have a safe, and usually compliant, in-
teraction. The International Standard ISO 10218-2
presents general hardware requirements for collabora-
tive robot operations, such as ergonomic design, no
sharp-edges, no protrusions, accessibility of the guid-
ing device and location and function of protective de-
vices [International Organization for Standardization,
2011b]. Extensive work has been done to develop hard-
ware that is safe to collaborate with [Ham et al., 2009;
Hoshi and Shinoda, 2006; Vanderborght et al., 2013;
Kühne et al., 2015]. In the last decade, several robotics
manufacturers have developed industrial robots designed
to operate in proximity with humans: for example,
UR3, UR5 and UR10 by Universal Robots [Universal
Robots], Baxter and Sawyer by Rethink Robotics [Re-
think Robotics], the ABB Yumi [ABB], and the KUKA
LBR iiwa [KUKA AG].
Even if the hardware is considered safe, the integrator
is also responsible of the overall system safety, including
the application and possible additional components in-
tegrated in the system [International Organization for
Standardization, 2011b]. A more flexible way to en-
sure safety is to address the problem at a system design
and integration level, taking advantage of modern con-
trol techniques and sensors. A recent survey focusing on
studies in this field presents a wide variety of possible
approaches [Lasota et al., 2017].
Some industrial applications involve complex and dy-
namic environments, which itself presents several haz-
ards and challenges to the human operator. Conse-
quently, ensuring safety leads to many implementation
challenges. In fact, the system designer has often to com-
promise, due to the cost of safety-related technology, or
software implementation limits, such as computational
power. The design of a new system is usually a time-
demanding process. Deciding which safety methods a
system will feature is paramount, and can jeopardize the
success of the technology. A guideline for which safety
methods are worth investing into will definitely benefit
system integrators working with collaborative robots.
This paper is aimed at collaborative systems that in-
volve pHRI, with human and robot in direct physical
contact and willingly exchanging forces to accomplish
a common task. We refer to this type of interaction as
physical Human-Robot Collaboration (pHRC). In Fig. 1,
an example of pHRC is shown, with a human controlling
a robot manipulator through physical exchange of inter-
action forces.
We present a safety framework, that gives as an output
a system of modules that are organized into a three level
hierarchy: approaches, strategies and methods. Each
module represents a way to reduce the risk associated to
a hazard, with each module having its own advantages
and drawbacks. Which module to be used in the system
design and integration depends on the risks associated
with the specific application, therefore a procedure to
systematically analyze risks and design a safety solution
is suggested. Finally, a case study is described as an
example of how this methodology can be used to design
a safety framework.
2 Framework
Often, hazards cannot be eliminated, but the associ-
ated risk can be reduced to an acceptable level. This
is achieved through a process called risk management.
In 2010, the International Organization for Standardiza-
tion published the ISO 12100 to specify techniques of risk
assessment and risk reduction to help designers achieve
satisfactory safety in the design of machinery [Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization, 2010].
We define a safety framework as a process which re-
duces the risk associated to hazards and hazardous sit-
uations, and is the result of the following design steps:
1. Identify hazards and hazardous situations;
2. Assess the risk associated with each hazard;
3. Identify which modules help reduce the risk;
4. Select safety modules;
5. Evaluate whether the resulting risk is acceptable.
The resulting solution is always a compromise between
achieved risk, system performances and cost, in terms of
money and time.
2.1 Hazard identification and risk
assessment
In Table 1, hazards common to pHRC are listed, orga-
nized by topic. These hazards are not the only ones to
be considered and the topics are not exhaustive, but can
be treated as a guideline.
Generally, the application, and the environment where
the interaction will take place, are pivotal to iden-
tify potential hazards and hazardous situations. The
application-related hazards reported in Table 1 are ex-
amples that may commonly be encountered.
Some of the listed hazards can also be generated by
fully automated robots, however they become critical
when a human is physically interacting with the sys-
tem. For example, kinematic singularities and jerky
movements also affect industrial robots in traditional
non pHRC applications, but during pHRC the potential
loss of control caused by them will have a large impact
on the safety, due to the proximity of human and robot.
As stated in the ISO 12100, the risk related to a haz-
ard is a function of the severity of harm that can result
from that hazard and the probability of occurrence of
Figure 2: Safety framework for risk reduction in applications involving pHRC
that harm [International Organization for Standardiza-
tion, 2010]. Risk matrices are a visual tool to quickly
assess the risk level given the likelihood and the conse-
quences. For example, a collision between the robot and
the environment will be less critical than an undesired
collision between the robot and a person, and even less
critical than a person being pinched between the robot
and fences.
Once a risk level has been selected for each of the
identified hazards, each risk has to be reduced to an
acceptable level by using appropriate safety modules.
2.2 Safety modules
In order to reduce the risk to an acceptable level, the
likelihood or the severity of a hazard have to be reduced.
In Fig. 2, possible means to reduce the risk in pHRC are
listed, organized in three levels. Those safety modules,
when combined, create a solution to decrease the overall
risk of the system, improving the safety.
The three levels organize the modules approaches,
strategies or methods. The integrator will use them to
systematically decide which modules to include in their
framework. For example, if the integrator is utilizing a
robot manipulator available in the market, and it is un-
desirable to modify the robot design, then they would
not utilize the modules within that approach, but they
will have to obtain an acceptable level of risk from dif-
ferent approaches.
Safety by robot design
The mechanical design of a manipulator has a huge im-
pact on system safety. In fact, one of the main sources
of danger for humans is mechanical power, and actua-
Table 1: Common hazards in pHRC classified by topic
Topic Hazard
1. Biomechanical limits 1.1 Forces over limit
1.2 Unergonomic interface
1.3 Uncomfortable posture
2. Human error 2.1 Unintended use
2.2 Psychological distress
2.3 Operator unengaged
3. Configuration 3.1 Kinematic singularities
3.2 Self-collision
4. Movement 4.1 Jerky movements
4.2 Vibrations
5. Collaborative workspace 5.1 Human-robot collision
5.2 Human pinched between robot links
5.3 Environment-robot collision
5.4 Workspace occluded
5.5 Human pinched between robot and object
5.6 Human trapped
6. Multiple human agents 6.1 Unexpected person in the workspace
6.2 Human-human interaction
7. Multiple robot agents 7.1 Robot-robot collision
7.2 Human pinched between robots
8. Application 8.1 Tool harming human agent
8.2 Tool damaging robot agent
8.3 Tool damaging objects or environment
tors play an important role in producing it. Vander-
borght et al. [Vanderborght et al., 2013] offers a good
review and classifications of Variable Impedance Actua-
tors (VIAs), including Series Elastic Actuators (SEAs)
and Series Damper Actuators (SDAs). The design of
these devices can be quite complex and the same review
also mentions that it is possible to achieve the behavior
of a VIA by software control. This has the advantage of
not relying on the physical stiffness and damping factor
of the actuator, but as a drawback presents a complex
controller and no energy can be passively absorbed in the
actuator, which means that shocks cannot be absorbed.
The way mechanical power is transferred from the
robot to the human depends on the shape of the me-
chanical parts that contact the human. The whole sys-
tem should have smooth surfaces and no sharp edges, so
that, in case of impact with the operator, the collision
force will be spread on a wider area, reducing the pres-
sure on human tissues. When designing the exteriors of
the system, ergonomics should play an important role.
It should take into account not only the comfort of the
operator, but also biomechanical parameters [Robotiq,
2016]. Furthermore, the aesthetic look of the robot will
directly affect its acceptability among users and possibly
make its usage more intuitive [Goetz et al., 2003].
Safety by control
All modern robots are provided with proprioceptive sen-
sors, so that their configuration can be always moni-
tored and controlled. This makes it possible to solve
issues generated by undesired configurations, such as
the ones corresponding to self-collisions (collisions be-
tween parts of the same robot) and singularities. These
configurations can be avoided, restricting the operat-
ing workspace, or can be handled using specific con-
trol strategies. During pHRC, to obtain a smooth in-
teraction, the movement of the system should not be
abruptly interrupted, but gently discouraged, for ex-
ample by applying force fields [Dimeas et al., 2018;
Carmichael et al., 2017].
Impedance and admittance control systems and their
variants are the most common controllers used in
pHRC [Rezazadegan et al., 2015]. They focus on model-
ing the interaction in terms of impedance/admittance,
as a combination of stiffness and damping. A direct
or indirect measurement of the interaction force is re-
quired, which means having additional sensors or a good
dynamic model of the system. Another option is to sim-
plify the dynamic requirements by only taking the stiff-
ness/compliance of the system into account and ignoring
the damping term.
An easy way to improve the safety of a robot is to
limit velocities and forces on both joint and Cartesian
spaces, and this is in fact one of the first strategies being
standardized in pHRC, but in some cases might be too
restrictive. Due to new sensors, the limits on kinematic
and dynamic parameters can be more flexible.
Safety by interaction
In pHRC, the human operator is always present and is
the greatest unknown in the whole system because their
actions can be unpredictable. Studies related to safety
often focus on the physical aspect of safety, however, the
way a machine or a task psychologically affects a person
is also important. A scared or distracted operator will
be more inclined to perform poorly and cause human
errors. During pHRC, the robot assists the operator in
performing a task. One way to keep the user engaged is
to only provide partial assistance, requiring the operator
to contribute to the task and hence promote engagement.
A better but more complex strategy is to have a variable
level of assistance. A dynamic feedback is more likely to
keep a user engaged compared to a static one [Byrne
and Parasuraman, 1996]. The human-machine interface
in general is a powerful means that can greatly influence
the level of engagement.
The physical interaction between humans and robots
should happen through an interface specifically designed
for this purpose. If the application introduces hazards
that can be avoided by controlling the position of the
operator, hold-to-run devices on the handles can re-
strict the position and pose of the user depending on
the design of this interface. Safety measures such as 3-
position switches can always be integrated and used to
trigger protective stops, in case the device is released or
squeezed too hard, due to an unexpected event.
In their survey, Lasota et al. [Lasota et al., 2017] con-
siders post-collision strategies to minimize the impact
caused by collisions. Using a direct or indirect mea-
surement of forces and torques is a common strategy of
detecting unexpected collisions. Load cells and soft skin
capable of sensing touch are some approaches used. How
best to react to an impact is still an open question, but
generally the reaction time should be as small as possi-
ble.
Safety by environment design
The workspace layout is an important feature of the sys-
tem and it greatly conditions the interaction, the risk
assessment and the safety measures. The location of the
robot may impact the perception of the human towards
the system. For example, having a big industrial robot
above the level of the operator’s head might cause them
distress. Not only the operative environment, where the
collaborative task takes place, but also the shared en-
vironment and the surroundings have to be taken into
account. Where possible, clearance between the system
and fixed objects, walls and fences, should be imple-
mented. If working in restricted areas, collision avoid-
ance is critical, to avoid humans being pinched.
Safety by environment awareness
A feature of collaborative systems is that they can work
in flexible conditions, taking advantage of human adapt-
ability. The use of vision systems and proximity sen-
sors to obtain information about the area surrounding
the robot allows unstructured and flexible environments.
Tracking the distance between robot parts and the hu-
man or parts of the environment could prevent accidental
collisions from happening. Lasota et al. [Lasota et al.,
2017] present in their study several pre-collision strate-
gies applied in pHRI. Skeleton tracking can be used to
track the pose of the human using digital human models.
In the case of multi-agent systems, it could be crucial to
monitor the location of each agent and share that infor-
mation. Unfortunately, tracking systems may fail due to
the limits of sensors and image processing algorithms.
Moreover, during pHRC, it is likely that the human or
the robot are partially occluded because of the small
distance between them. The decision of mounting the
sensors on-board of the system or around the environ-
ment may greatly affect performances and transportabil-
ity. The big drawback of vision systems and algorithms
is that, depending on the quantity and quality of data to
analyze, this process may be computationally demand-
ing.
Technologies such as Virtual Reality (VR) and Aug-
mented Reality (AR) can also be integrated in a safety
framework to help the operator gain information that
might not be immediately available. For example, VR
could help the user see parts of the environment that are
occluded by objects or environmental constraints, while
AR could help identify how to correctly manipulate an
object during the collaborative task.
3 Development of the Proposed Safety
Method
There is not a definitive way to achieve safety, and risk
assessments and safety frameworks are influenced by the
experience and knowledge of the people designing them.
Table 2 presents a matrix with the hazards listed in Ta-
ble 1 and the modules shown in Fig. 2, that could reduce
the associated risk.
The purpose of this section is to provide a general
guide to people who have identified one of the listed haz-
ards and are looking for strategies to reduce the relative
risk.
The reported level of risk is selected by considering the
likelihood of the hazardous event and the severity of the
harm/damage caused by it. The level of risk reduction is
a result of how that safety method affects the likelihood
Table 2: Matrix with hazards and safety methods in pHRC. The risk related to a hazard and the risk reduction
introduced by a safety method are also reported as an indicative measure. The risk associated to application-related
hazards cannot be assessed.
Risk
Safety Methods









1.3 ++ × ×
2.1 ++ × × ×
2.2 + × × ×
2.3 + × × × × ×
3.1 ++ × ×
3.2 + ×
4.1 + × × × × × ×
4.2 + × × × × ×
5.1 +++ × × × × × × × × × ×
5.2 +++ × × × × × × × × × ×
5.3 ++ × × × × × × × × × × × ×
5.4 ++ × × × × ×
5.5 +++ × × × × × × × ×
5.6 + × × ×
6.1 ++ × ×
6.2 + × × × ×
7.1 ++ × ×




Risk reduction *** ** ** *** *** * ** ** ** ** ** *** *** * ** *** ** *** *** * *** ** *** * ** ** **
or/and severity of a hazardous event. The reported risk
level will be subject to the knowledge and experience of
the persons conducting the risk assessment.
The risk and risk reduction are expressed on a 3-levels
scale. The risk can be low (+), moderate (++) and
extreme (+++), with low corresponding to no direct
harm to human or objects and extreme corresponding
to life-threatening event. The risk reduction is classi-
fied as lowly (*), moderately (**) and highly effective
(***), but it largely depends on how the safety method
is designed and developed.
It may not be possible to suggest safety modules to
reduce the risk introduced by hazards specific to the ap-
plication. The tool, usually located on the robot end-
effector, often introduces most of the application-related
hazards. The operator is in fact often in its proxim-
ity and the interaction between robot and environment
happens through the tool.
Something to consider when choosing which modules
to implement is that the international standards ISO
10218-1 and ISO 10218-2 [International Organization for
Standardization, 2011a; 2011b] state that every safety-
related part of the control system has to comply with
Performance Level (PL) = d with structure category 3
as detailed in ISO 13849-1:2015 [International Organi-
zation for Standardization, 2015]. This means that the
method has to include cross monitoring to detect even-
tual faults in the module.
All these methods can be implemented to reduce the
risk level associated to single hazards or to multiple ones.
Some of them may affect the risk related to the same haz-
ard, but sometimes such redundancy is considered bene-
ficial in reducing risk. After a comprehensive framework
is implemented, the risk should be reassessed to check
if all the identified hazards present acceptable levels of
risk.
Because safety modules generally have a price in terms
of money, time, effort and performance, the integrator
will always have to do compromises, depending on re-
sources and priorities.
4 Case Study
We implemented the framework, using the above men-
tioned strategy, to achieve safety for a system operating
in a highly challenging environment. The solution was
developed keeping in mind the modularity of the solution
and the benefits that redundant modules could enhance
safety. The resulting robotic system is the ANBOT
(Assistance-as-Needed roBOT), designed and developed
by the Centre for Autonomous Systems (CAS), within
the University of Technology Sydney (UTS) [Carmichael
et al., 2019]. In Fig. 3 an operator is shown while using
the system in its industrial application.
Figure 3: An operator performing grit blasting using the
ANBOT system
4.1 Application
Abrasive blasting is an industrial process to clean sur-
faces from contaminants. Operators have to sustain
loads ranging from 49 to 130 N during dry blasting
tasks [Momber, 2008], along with the weight introduced
by the nozzle and the hose. Operators get easily fa-
tigued and their performances deteriorate quickly during
their shifts. This makes abrasive blasting a physically
demanding job and a good candidate for an assistive
system.
There are several types of abrasive blasting depend-
ing on the material used. We use grit blasting as a case
study, because of the additional challenge introduced by
the environment. This kind of blasting takes place in
blasting chambers. During operation the chamber be-
comes filled with airborne particles which reduce visibil-
ity.
4.2 Risk assessment
The presented risk assessment is not a comprehensive
one, but just an example of the hazards, and associated
risks, related to pHRC in a grit blasting application.
We identified the hazards listed in Table 1, excluding
the ones relative to multiple human and robot agents,
since our system is meant to be operated by one operator
and only one robot manipulator is used. The application
introduces the following additional hazards:
• 8.1 Operator is in the blasting stream (Risk: +++);
• 8.2 Nozzle is released from tool while blasting and
hits the operator (Risk: ++);
• 8.3 Blasting material damages the robot (Risk:
++).
To simplify the process of designing a safe system for
pHRC, a UR10 by Universal Robots was used as a ma-
nipulator. This robot arm is certified for collaborative
operation, and, even if the integrator has to reassess the
risks of the manipulator as a component of a system,
this robot features safety-related options that makes it
easier to achieve high safety levels. It is in fact possible
to easily set force and velocities limits, and the controller
issues a protective stop in case of singular configuration
or collision.
4.3 Resulting safety system
Table 3 lists the identified hazards and the modules im-
plemented to target the relative risk.
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5.1 B.1 D.1 E.1 E.2 H.1
5.2 B.1 D.1 E.1 E.2 H.1




8.1 B.2 G.1 G.2 SP
8.2 SP
8.3 SP
Each control interface includes an emergency stop, and
sharp edges are avoided in the mechanical design. The
system features an admittance controller, which takes
into account interaction forces and torques through a
load cell located between the tool and the manipulator.
Limits for velocities, accelerations, forces and torques are
hard-coded in the control system and we use the UR10
to control forces in the eventuality of an unintended col-
lision as a redundant safety measure. The tool is where
the physical interaction happens. It has been designed
in a way that is not only comfortable for the user, but
also constrains the human position relative to the tool.
It has two handles equipped with 3-position switches,
working as hold-to-run devices. In case the user releases
or squeezes them as a reaction to an unexpected event,
the controller issues a protective stop. To be able to
blast, the operator has to hold both the handles and
the switches have to be in the middle position. A plas-
tic shield is placed in front of the handles, protecting the
operator’s hands from bouncing particles and preventing
the user from holding the tool in the wrong direction. As
a consequence, this forces the operator to be behind the
tool and out of the blast stream.
The constraints set on the dynamic parameters de-
crease the severity of the consequences in case of colli-
sion. To reduce the likelihood of impact with the en-
vironment, four Kinect 1 cameras are used to scan the
workspace and create a virtual 3D grid which generates
force fields around the detected obstacles. The robot
is attached to a base that can be moved with a pallet
jack and to improve the transportability of the system
the integrated vision sensors are on-board. We also use
force fields to avoid self-collisions and singularities, and
in case a problematic configuration is reached a protec-
tive stop is issued. To engage the operator in the task
and enhance their awareness a variable level of assis-
tance is provided. The implemented method is a model-
based assistance-as-needed algorithm and uses the pose
of the upper body to calculate the assistance to provide
the user [Carmichael and Liu, 2013]. As specific safety
methods implemented for this application, the nozzle is
attached to the tool with a mechanism that cannot be
unintentionally released and the system has an inner and
outer cover to protect components from airborne parti-
cles.
Some of the implemented methods are used as redun-
dant safety means, to reduce an already acceptable risk
level.
5 Conclusions
Safety is a topic undergoing intense study in the field of
robotics and it is especially challenging in applications
involving pHRC, due to the proximity of humans and
robots. To improve safety, many techniques have been
developed, but choosing which one to implement can be
challenging. In this paper, a framework to help select
those techniques is suggested: after identifying hazards
and assessing the associated risk, the described methods
can be evaluated, depending on their effectiveness in re-
ducing the risk versus available resources. The resulting
safety solution is a set of modules that together reduce
the overall risk to an acceptable level. To validate the
framework, this methodology has been applied to a grit
blasting application of pHRC, with promising results.
As technological advancements continue, new safety
methods will be designed and developed. In fact, only
a few decades ago, people would have not been able
to safely physically interact with robots. Safety tech-
niques can be used to reduce the risks of technologies
that can potentially improve quality of life, and a sys-
tematic methodology to integrate them will make the
process more objective and fast. This framework is spe-
cially useful to highlight the direction that researchers
should pursue to achieve safety in a robot system that
physically interacts with humans.
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Florian Petit, Jens Reinecke, Roman Weitschat, and
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